Debates concerning residential population displacement in the context of gentrification remain vociferous, but are hampered by a lack of empirical evidence of the extent of the displacement occurring. The lack of quantitative evidence on gentrification-induced displacement and the difficulties in collecting it has long hampered the fight against it. Based on a systematic review of quantitative studies of the displacement associated with gentrification, this paper considers how researchers have attempted to measure displacement using a range of statistical and mapping techniques reflecting the multidimensional character of gentrification. We note that these techniques often struggle to provide meaningful estimates of the number of individuals and households displaced by gentrification, something compounded by the lack of data available on a sufficiently granular temporal and spatial scale. Noting the limitations of extant methods, we conclude by considering the potential of more novel data sources and emergent methods involving the processing of larger amounts of (micro)data, as well as participatory GIS methods that involve affected communities themselves. This implies that whilst the quantitative study of displacement remains difficult, patterns and processes of displacement can be inferred through existing data sources, as well as data generated from those who themselves have experienced displacement. Displacement, gentrification, housing, method, neighbourhood, redevelopment, regeneration.
outlining the key academic debates on gentrification and displacement in order to set the context of the review. It then reviews some of the principal quantitative approaches to studying gentrification-induced displacement before exploring some important limitations of this literature relating to the choice of data sources, spatial units and time scales. While most of the relevant literature focuses on the US or UK, the review also explores more recent research undertaken in Europe and beyond.
Identifying neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification
Studies of gentrification-induced displacement often presuppose the accurate identification of neighbourhoods having experienced gentrification. This is important in relation to measuring displacement, as neighbourhoods not undergoing gentrification are frequently used as baseline comparators for displacement in neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification. Unfortunately, although the broad dimensions of gentrification are often agreed (see Davidson and Lees, 2005, for a contemporary definition), the operationalization of these dimensions in terms of measurable variables are far more equivocal. As an illustration, Galster and Peacock (1986) operationalized gentrification by constructing several logistic least-squares regression models using different census variables for Philadelphia . Their key finding was that variable selection had a significant impact on which, and how many, census tract areas were defined as neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification:
'Our empirical analysis of Philadelphia showed unambiguously that how one defines gentrification crucially affects which and how many tracts are identified as having undergone gentrification, and which.characteristics of those tracts appear to hold the greatest explanatory power for such changes. The sensitivity of these important conclusions to both the definitional criterion used and the stringency with which it is applied is apparent' (Galster and Peacock, 1986: 333-334).
of gentrification-related displacement; in the end 27 articles were included in the review. In several cases the quantitative strand was part of mixed methods research. It remains notable that there are many more qualitative than quantitative publications on gentrification-induced displacement. We updated this list with 2018 journal articles.
Similar tendencies are noted in Barton's (2016) application of contrasting census-based models from Bostic and Martin (2003) and Freeman (2005) to identify neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification in New York City, comparing these to the results of a content analysis of gentrification stories in The New York Times. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these different methods identified wildly different sets of neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification.
In the light of the multi-dimensional character of gentrification it would then seem preferable to identify neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification using a combination of variables, or at least to undertake sensitivity-testing for different univariate proxies. Freeman (2005: 469-470) , for example, made use of variables corresponding to:
i.
city centre location;
ii. relatively low income (compared to median for the metropolitan area);
iii. older housing stock (measured through low rate-of new-build -although this is not necessarily the same as old ie. Victorian stock);
iv. an increase in higher mean educational level than for metropolitan area;
v. a steeper Increase in house (owner-occupied) prices.
Other examples of a multi-dimensional operationalisation are provided by Maciag (2015) and Desmond and Gershenson (2017) , with the latter seeking to test the relationship between eviction and gentrification by studying households on a low median income at the start of the study period (2000) and exploring increases in mean educational level and median home values over time. They also included other variables that may be correlated with gentrification such as non-white population 2 and concentrated disadvantage (see also Holm and Schulz, 2018, who modelled neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification in Berlin).
Following the work of Hammel and Wyly (1996) , Walks and Maaranen (2008) developed a similar method for identifying neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification using principal components analysis (PCA). They applied this to four variables (mean individual income, the proportion of tenants, socioeconomic status based on employment rate and professionals/managers, and the percentage of artists resident in an area), field-testing their results by checking with local experts in three Canadian cities. More recently, Reades et al. 2 But note that the non-white population is only correlated with gentrification at the baseline, not at the end of the process.
(2018) employed machine learning methods in an attempt to relate neighbourhood ascent in London (measured using four indicators) to 166 different variables, including environmental measures of proximity to green spaces and mean travel times to central London. Their work suggests that data-driven and probabilistic models may be more useful in the description and prediction of gentrification than the spatial, rule-based models more commonplace in urban systems modelling (see also Zhou, 2018) . This is because there is a complex range of possible relationships between social and environmental variables that can unfold in different neighbourhoods, with attempts to predict change in a neighbourhood based on the state of adjacent ones unlikely to yield accurate prediction of change (Royall and Wortmann, 2015) . Of course there is a difference between research that is trying to identify gentrifying neighbourhoods and research that is trying to predict gentrification. The implications of gentrification scholars trying to predict possible trajectories of neighbourhood change re. the process could well be exploited by those in search of rent gaps, indeed the ethical implications have yet to be debated.
Measures of gentrification-induced displacement
Accepting that displacement is much harder to detect than gentrification (Elliot-Cooper, Hubbard and Lees, 2019) , here we consider attempts to measure displacement initially developed in the context of gentrification studies. Notably, early studies concerned with gentrification and displacement from the 1950s to the 1970s focused on post war, state-led, slum clearance programmes. For example, estimates of the post-war slum clearances based on data from the UK Ministry of Housing and Local Government suggests that around 4 million properties housing the best part of 15 million people were demolished between 1955 -1985 (Tunstall and Lowe, 2012 . 3 US state programmes of urban 'renewal' in the 1950s and 1960s also behoved mandatory surveys of populations implicated for relocation for the purpose of relocation assistance (Hartman, 1980) . However, the extent of the more dispersed gentrification-induced displacement which urban scholars began to take note of (in the UK in the 1960s and in the US in the 1970s) was not officially recorded in a similar manner. This hampered accurate enumeration of the number of households affected by gentrification-induced 3 Variation in the recording of clearance data appears to revolve around a lack of clarity on whether figures are for buildings or "dwelling spaces". 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 displacement and led to contested estimates as to its extent (Grier and Grier, 1978; Hartman,1979; Sumka, 1979; Gale, 1979) . This appeared to be related to markedly opposing views on gentrification, with those lauding the positive benefits of US inner city "revitalization" downplaying any negative impacts. Meanwhile, Marxist researchers, such as Smith (1979) were becoming increasingly concerned about the free market ideologies encouraging gentrification.
At this point in time, empirical studies into gentrification-induced displacement in the US began to emerge, mostly focused on single cities or neighbourhoods (Lee and Hodge, 1984; LeGates and Hartman, 1986) . Some -including Clay (1979) i. 'Are beyond the household's reasonable ability to control or prevent;
ii. Occur despite the household's having met all previously-imposed conditions of occupancy;
iii. Make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable'.
The latter point was connected to the high rate of abandoned property in formerly disinvested US inner city neighbourhoods that had been left to decay during the recession of the 1970s (Wallace and Wallace, 1990) . The Griers' definition covers failure of the landlord to provide basic amenities (maintenance, heat, light), the influence of health and safety hazards, and sudden increases in rent which make the property unaffordable to that tenant -but not defaults on rent, breaches of contract or 'voluntary' moves. However, Grier and Grier (1978) highlighted that it is often difficult to discern the difference between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' migration.
This noted, most early studies of gentrification-induced displacement attempted to enumerate the number of residents forced out of their neighbourhoods, these studies mainly involved gathering data about migrant (mover) characteristics through interviews (Gale, 1980; LeGates and Hartman, 1986 Freeman, 2005; Freeman et al., 2016) . Indeed, studies of displacement rates between different cities has often been hampered by variation in definitions of displacement, as well as by differences in city attributes and population size (Hodge, 1981: 193-194 ).
Subsequently, more attention has been directed towards theorizing diverse processes of gentrification-induced displacement, with the work by Marcuse (1986) especially significant in distinguishing between different forms of direct and indirect displacement (including exclusionary displacement) as summarised and updated in Table 1 . Marcuse (1986: 156-57) suggested comparison of available housing units at two time points (before and after gentrification had started) could take account of excluded properties by measuring the pool of available dwellings. However, he argued that allowance needed to be made for variation in the number of dwellings due to ongoing change in the interim period (e.g. through new-build, infill and conversion). A further implication of exclusionary displacement is that poorer households may become 'trapped' in their current housing as the pool of options available to them in the local area decreases. Poorer owner-occupier households such as elderly householders may also incur increased costs of residing in areas of rising house-prices through increases in tax on their more valuable properties (Martin and Beck, 2018) .
[Insert Table 1 here]
Marcuse's (1986) work also stressed the importance of measuring displacement pressure -when residents in the neighbourhood are negatively affected by the displacement occurring around them, such as the loss of outmigrating neighbours and friends, local shops changing hands to being run by or for social "others", the downgrading of services, and other environmental changes. Acknowledging such factors takes fuller account of the social and psychological aspects of neighbourhood change by encompassing the perceived loss of local He also recognised, however, that it would be extremely difficult for large areas. For example, in order to determine the level of involuntary migration, one must identify which out-migrations were voluntary, something that would mean tracing and interviewing all migrants/displacees, which is of course unlikely to be feasible across a large area.
In this regard, others have similarly highlighted the difficulty of trying to measure a phenomenon that may entail following-up households who have disappeared from their former location, and, as noted by Baeten et al., these households may be averse to participating in official surveys:
'The precarious housing situations of displaced people, people doubling up with others, etcetera, often exist outside official records, and, when traced, these people are not necessarily willing to 'be interviewed' about their troublesome life trajectories ' (Baeten et al., 2017: 635) .
This serves to illustrate some of the key problems in the measurement of displacement, and the lack of comparable data which continues to plague this research area. Equally, some researchers have proceeded with notions of displacement that appear ill-suited for measuring enforced moves. For example Lyons (1996: 43) -despite noting that 'migration is not synonymous with displacement' -proceeded to conflate the two, suggesting that wealthier households who choose to move as an economic investment strategy 'are economically displaced in another sense because they cannot improve their circumstances within the neighbourhood'. This turns on its head the fundamental point that displacement is involuntary -a process which behoves households to move/migrate for reasons outwith their control (see Grier and Grier 1978; Hartman, 1980; Marcuse, 1986; Atkinson, 2000) . Here, it is important to stress that most migration involving 'better-off households making housing and investment choices' (Lyons 1996:44) is not displacement but outmigration motivated by financial gain.
Many authors have then sought to measure evidence of displacement by researching population and neighbourhood change. Here, differences in the demographic and socio-economic for example, possible that older people are choosing to leave the inner city to move to a retirement community, and an influx of twenty and thirty-somethings are succeeding them.
Indeed, Hamnett (2003) has argued that it is population replacement rather than displacement which has occurred in London as a result of the post-industrial restructuring of employment, the economy and the housing market -a distinction that has remained extremely difficult to prove within the confines of the available data 4 . A further issue is that in the absence of longitudinal data on individual income, it is not possible to say if reductions in the numbers of the poorest is because of their outmigration or the fact they may have benefitted from the general socio-economic uplift of an area (Atkinson, 2000; Ellen and O'Regan, 2011) .
In contrast to studies of direct displacement, Liu et al. (2017) note that studies of indirect displacement are rare. An exception is the San Francisco City and Council Board on Displacement in the Mission District, which provides evidence of exclusionary displacement (Brousseau, 2015) . The City of San Francisco has been subject to numerous waves of gentrification from the growth of gayborhoods in the 1970s through to the 'Tech Booms' of the 1990s and contemporary gentrifications linked to an explosion of internet start-ups and relocations from Silicon Valley (Opillard, 2015) . Brousseau (2015) analysed US decennial Census and American Community Survey (5-year pooled) data, estimating that the significant change in the proportion of high income households in the Mission district 2000-13 was associated with a 48% increase in owner-occupation (38% more than the citywide figure) and inflated rents due to high demand/low supply, which fuelled a disparity in rent-to-income ratios favouring the top fifth of earners. It was estimated that the median citywide market rent applicable in the Mission district would be unaffordable to 81% of households in the district based on local income data (i.e. housing costs of more than 30% of the household's income).
Subtracting new-build properties, 5% of housing stock was estimated to have changed tenure 4 For critiques of Hamnett's replacement thesis, see Watt (2008) plus Davidson and Wyly (2012) . Millard-Ball's (2002) 'whole-market' approach proceeds from a slightly different spatial perspective, with the impact of aggregate migration flows of displacees to destination areas also taken into account. This stresses a sudden increase in housing demand in neighbouring lowincome areas may drive rent rises which will have the knock-on effect of displacing the poorest from those areas through both direct economic and exclusionary displacement. This type of 'chain effect' is described by Liu et al. (2017) following the 'price-shadowing' of redevelopment schemes in Shenzhen, China. Here, the construction of new, large-scale (high-rise) gated community projects on 'village-in-the-city' sites has displaced low income (rural) migrant renters, which has in turn rippled out creating a property hotspot due to the increased local housing demand from displacees who wish to continue living in the neighbourhood. This has led to increased rents and overcrowding in remaining affordable areas for migrant workerrenters and, once all their resources are exhausted, some have no option but to leave the city.
This stresses that direct forms of displacement entwine with indirect forms of displacement such as exclusionary displacement. However, a 'whole system' approach to researching the chain effect of displacement is difficult to operationalize (Liu et al., 2017) . In part, this is because of the complex chorographies of displacement: Zhang and He (2018: 135) have suggested that 'gentrification-induced displacement not only links to the very moment when an [involuntary displacement] eviction takes place', but also relates to the temporalities 'before, in the midst of, and after the eviction', providing a particular challenge for the quantification of displacement.
Time, space and displacement
The economic position of households is not static, but subject to change over time (Vigdor, 2002; Ellen and O'Regan, 2011) . Poor households may cycle in and out of poverty, and household income may increase with economic upturns, individual age or household stage (e.g. young family, mature empty nest, etc). The reverse is also true of course -stage of life and life events such as relationship fractures, illness and unemployment may result in downward social mobility and moves to poorer areas through loss of income (Airey, 2003; Desmond and Gershenson, 2017) . However, few studies of displacement incorporate life events or 'shocks' -such as losing a job, being made redundant or a relationship split (but see Desmond and
Gershenson, 2017).
The concept of 'duration dependence' alludes to the relationship between the likelihood (also known as the 'risk' or 'hazard') of moving out and duration of residence. Generally, the probability of moving may be affected by the duration of stay up to that point: the longer residents stay in place, the more cumulative investment and commitment they might have to their neighbourhood (Gordon and Molho, 1995; Thomas et al., 2016) . Although this may at first appear to apply to residents who have a choice about moving, such as owner-occupiers, the length of residence in private-rented accommodation may also affect a private landlord's propensity to inflate the rent to unaffordable levels, or evict in cases where residents have reliable long-standing records of rent payment (Desmond and Gershenson, 2017: 369) .
In such cases the so-called 'hazard rate' of outmigration may increase steeply at first, peak early and then decrease over time, producing a hill-shaped distribution (Gordon and Molho, 1995; Thomas et al., 2016) . This characteristic of the shape of the underlying hazard function requires the selection of a statistically appropriate model that allows for this specific form of distribution further issue when modelling with spatial data is the fact that phenomena (people, housing stock, income) tend to be more similar the closer they are to one another. This is known as "within-area homogeneity" (Tranmer and Steel, 1998) Unfortunately, Desmond and Gershenson (2017) give a very limited description of their methodology and do not include the type of model estimation (which is assumed to be logistic regression as they report a pseudo-R 2 and binary dependent variable). This is important because the underlying distribution should be matched to the shape of the hazard function for the risk of eviction.
Relatively few studies have employed multilevel modelling to study gentrification-induced displacement. Liu et al. (2017) used it to test the indirect 'price-shadowing' effect associated which take into account the pattern of the likelihood of moving might ultimately be more appropriate.
The problems of data availability
Most quantitative studies of gentrification-induced displacement have employed national censuses and/or local survey data -data that come with significant limitations in terms of revealing actual patterns of intra-urban migration and displacement. In some cases these limitations cannot be easily disconnected from governmental interests given gentrification appears to have become an official tool of urban policy (Herrera et al., 2007; Lees et al, 2016; Baeten et al., 2017) . As the majority of studies covered in this review have originated from the US and the UK, sources of data from these countries are the focus here, although the issues raised may be generalizable to other national contexts (e.g. see Bernt and Holm, 2009; Posthumus et al, 2012) . The key statistical sources of data are briefly outlined below, noting their advantages and disadvantages for measuring displacement.
Census data has been the key source of demographic and housing data in many countries including the US and UK. Invariably, the utility of such periodic data collection for inferring displacement depends not only on the currency of the data, but also the salience of the questions asked: for example, the omission of data relating to household income, rent or house prices in the UK census has long-frustrated attempts to explore housing affordability. Likewise key data sources such as the US Annual Housing Survey, described by Hodge (1981: 194) as 'the most comprehensive source of intraurban migration' at the time, failed to include rent increases and other housing costs (Cousar, 1978) . In contrast, the American Community Survey (ACS) -a rolling sample survey -includes questions on rent and monthly mortgage payments, with a high response rate (over 92% in 2015) . Irrespective, census products are typically only available in aggregate form at a range of geographies, often built up from small area building blocks such as the UK's Output Area (OA) of 300 people (ONS, nd). Such aggregation presents well-known problems, as noted above.
Similarly, we have stated that when tracing displacement, tracking change over time can be important. This suggests that longitudinal data sources may be of more value than snapshots taken at a given point. The England and Wales Longitudinal Study provides an example, comprising the linked records of a 1% sample of the census population longitudinally.
However, the lack of a full migration history for individuals in this dataset is a particular problem for the study of displacement (Atkinson, 2000 findings cannot be verified or tested using ground-truthing within the specific spatiotemporal contexts of gentrification (Hammel and Wyly, 1996) . Nonethless, the BHPS has been used by Freeman et al (2016) to estimate displacement at a local authority level. Housing Survey -which began later in 1993). This consists of multiple records per individual which can potentially be linked to create a longitudinal record of their work, benefits, and pension history. Each recorded spell contains a start and end date and the individual's address. Although these may not always be up-to-date, this data has the distinct advantage that it covers all state benefit claimants, pensioners and people paying taxes. This longitudinal microdata on individuals could potentially provide individual histories of changing income and residential mobility, which could be used to analyse the relationship between benefits or pension status, income and potential economic displacement from homes through, for example, changes in circumstances such as job-loss.
Benefit and tax credit data could also potentially be used to give insight into the proportion of income that poorer people in London are paying in housing costs given Housing Benefit and other means-tested benefits entail an assessment of the household's income and outgoings, including rent. Therefore, housing benefit data, readily available at the Borough level, can indicate shifts in the numbers of those in housing need, with this data suggesting patterns of movement inner to outer London amongst those in the private-rented sector (Powell, 2015) .
Were such data available at more granular spatial scales it would be possible to investigate the relationship between benefit changes such as the 'bedroom tax', gentrification and residential displacement.
Given the limitations of national datasets, several studies have attempted to use local surveys instead. For example, Freeman and Braconi (2004) 
used the New York City Housing Vacancy
Survey to measure displacement (noting New York had implemented some form of rent control or 'rent stabilisation' since 1943). This longitudinal survey takes the dwelling as its unit of measurement on a three-yearly basis. Although Freeman and Braconi (2004) state that this measures mobility, the fact that the focus is on individual dwellings rather than households means that it cannot be used to study migration and mobility into and out of the city. Moreover, a three-year period cannot capture more rapid change. Desmond and Gershenson (2017) used the Milwaukee Area Renters Study to research associations between individual, neighbourhood and social network factors and the risk of eviction. This detailed face-to-face household survey from 2009-11 covered issues such as city living, housing and low-income groups, based on a sample of 1,086 households living in the private-rented sector, stratified by ethnic group. The response rate was high (over 83%), probably due to the direct contact method of administration.
Homeowners were excluded and the data was supplemented with over 100 evictions from legal cases within the previous two years. A particular strength of this survey for displacement studies is the two-year residential address history taken for each lead householder. These were geocoded and linked to 2,010 block groups (a neighbourhood proxy comprising approximately 1,135 residents per unit, about a quarter of the size of a US census tract).
Studies from other countries demonstrate the importance of different types of data as yet unavailable in the UK or US. Shin (2009) Creative, lateral-thinking may then play an important role in filling gaps in data. For example, in the study mentioned earlier mapping the mass displacement of mobile home residents due to the closure of privately-owned trailer parks, Sullivan (2017a) noted that while these mass eviction events could not be traced through the courts (because they were not legally challenged), they were recorded in state administrative data through changes in land-use codes, which could subsequently be mapped using GIS. The use of eviction data from court case records has though been a developing trend amongst housing activists, scholar-activists and concerned non-statutory organisations. In San Francisco, for example, the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is an activist-led project which seeks to document the ongoing displacement of lower income tenants in the San Francisco area. Relevant data on evictions, rent-levels, illegal holiday lets (AirB&B) and displacement practices is gathered through a range of largely unofficial sources such as the San Francisco Rent Board, provider organisations of Legal Aid and Services, public websites (eg. Rent Jungle, 2018), online crowdsourced surveys (see AntiEviction Mapping Project, 2018; Project, 2018) , and oral histories from local residents and evicted tenants (demonstrating the importance of mixed, quantitative and qualitative methods).
In the UK, The London Tenants' Federation, Lees, Just Space and SNAG (2014) collect spatial justice crowdsource data online and organise 'public workshops at community events or festivals to collect intelligence on the city directly from Londoners'.
Conclusion
The question of quantifying displacement has long vexed gentrification researchers, yet it is incredibly important in the fight against gentrification. Gentrification-induced displacement has been recognised since Glass (1964) first identified the displacement of former (working class) residents as a defining feature of gentrification. Nevertheless, progress in quantifying its extent has been remarkably slow. This is due, in part, to the contested identification of neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification, as well as the more obvious difficulties of tracking displacees using available datasets. In relation to the former, it is evident that gentrification occurs unevenly across time and space (Lees et al., 2008; Lees et al., 2015 Lees et al., ,2016 , implying that its multidimensional complexity is best operationalised using several variables in order to distinguish it from other contemporaneous processes of neighbourhood uplift. However, ground-truthing suggests there are always problems in identifying gentrification-induced displacement at a meso-level (such as the scale of individual census tracts), due to the piecemeal nature of gentrification, particularly in its early stages. Such problems are exacerbated by studying sub- neighbourhood change across spatial units that are simply too large. Such debate, however, is specific to classic gentrification that involves incremental changes over time, and ignores the increasing presence of state-led gentrification which is more often than not at a mega-scale and faster speed in both the global North and the global South (see Lees et al, 2015 Lees et al, ,2016 .
Quantifying gentrification-induced displacement in cities of the global South will, no doubt, throw up the same and different issues. Quantifying displacement from slum-gentrification in the global South, for example, is difficult due to a lack of formal or robust data on who lives in informal settlements; and of course this makes it easier for the state to enact slum gentrification and obfuscate the number of displacees (see Doshi, 2015) .
Our review also suggests that analysis needs to take a 'long view' in order to capture the accumulation of change unfolding within specific neighbourhoods (see Sims, 2016) . Studies which only reference two 'snapshots' of an area -e.g. at time-points a decade apart -may fail to adequately depict processes of urban change, unless these coincide with specific phases of urban development such as Tech Boom 2.0 in San Francisco (Opillard, 2015; Brousseau, 2015) or the state-led gentrification of council estates in London (Lees, 2014) . Even in these cases, changes at the micro-level of blocks and streets appear best ground-truthed by local experts.
Given the risk of mis-identifying neighbourhoods as gentrifying, this seems to be an essential part of the analytical process, although novel use of digital data products such as Google Street
View offers a less labour-intensive alternative (see, for example, Hwang and Sampson, 2014 and Ilic et al, 2019 , on using deep learning computer-based vision techniques). Ultimately, visual proxies like the make and age of cars on a given street may not be the best identifier of gentrification, but the ability to automatically analyse large numbers of images compiled over a number of years seems to offer an efficient means of registering where socio-economic change is occurring.
However, most important of all in a displacement context is access to viable sources of data enabling the tracking of individuals through space and across time. Until such data are collected or made available, the extent of residential gentrification-induced displacement will remain largely unrecorded and invisible. In the meantime, we appear reliant on proxies for actual displacement, such as broad indicators of population churn, changes in owner occupation, or changes in the ethnic and class make-up of particular neighbourhoods. While such measures can be suggestive of involuntary displacement occurring, they are rarely conclusive. Rather than being measures of displacement per se, these are perhaps best thought of as measures of displacement pressure (Marcuse, 1986) , or susceptibility to gentrification-induced migration (Chapple, 2009; Zuk and Chapple, 2016; Chapple at al, 2017) .
The failures of 'official' statistics to reveal actual flows of displaced people at the urban scale suggests that, for the moment, we must then rely on a mixture of proxy measures, approximations and predictions that reveal tendencies but which cannot be relied upon to distinguish between involuntary displacement, voluntary outmigration or incumbent socioeconomic uplift. The alternative is a form of 'data scavenging' that collates information from a variety of sources, including those collected via participatory methods or via analysis of social media data (e.g, Gibbons et al, 2018; Shelton et al, 2015; Zhou et al, 2015) . These less conventional approaches to collating quantitative data on gentrification-induced displacement are growing in importance in an age of 'big data' and participatory GIS (Goodchild, 2007; Aubrecht et al., 2011 Aubrecht et al., , 2016 . Obviously, there remain challenges here, particularly working with geotagged (point-referenced) information that can be used to reveal the existence of communities at different scales of resolution (Poorthuis, 2018) of data generated by citizens, the near ubiquitous capture of location, and the near permanent connectivity via web-enabled devices that allow data to be shared and uploaded'. But they warn against allowing the data to do its own talking as empirically and theoretically naïve, and assert that research questions need to be specified in advance. And critically, as the Data Justice Lab (https://datajusticelab.org/) make clear, we always need to consider questions of social justice in this new world of datafication and think about how we might best pursue 'data justice'. 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
